(See also Freedom of expression and contempt of court on this blog)
Several days ago the ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected all the grounds of appeal advanced by Florence Hartmann, convicted for contempt of the court.
Hartman, a journalist, served as the spokesperson for the former ICTY Prosecutor Carla del Ponte in 2000-2006.
In 2009, she disclosed in her publications some information in violation of two confidential Appeals Chamber’s decisions in the Milosevic case.
Rejecting one of the grounds of the appeal, the Appeals Chamber held that there is no strong presumption of unrestricted publicity for matters a Chamber has ruled are not to be disclosed to the public.
In this regard the Appeals Chamber recalled that Article 19(3) of the ICCPR recognises that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression may be subject to certain restrictions.
The restrictions shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary, in particular, for the protection of public order.
The Chamber further referred to the travaux préparatoires of the ICCPR which indicate that the protection of public order in Article 19(3) of the ICCPR was intended to include the prohibition of the procurement and dissemination of confidential information.
The Chamber also noted that, in respect of whether the restriction to an individual’s freedom of expression is “necessary” to achieve its aim, the Human Rights Committee considered whether the action taken was proportionate to the sought-after aim.
The Chamber found that the two appeal decisions in the Milosevic case contained restrictions on the freedom of expression that were “provided by law” because they were filed confidentially under protective measures granted pursuant to Rule 54bis of the ICTY Rules.
Furthermore, according to the Chamber, restricting Hartmann’s freedom of expression in this manner was both proportionate and necessary because it protected the “public order” by guarding against the dissemination of confidential information. These restrictions were therefore within the ambit of Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.
In this regard, the Appeals Chamber observed that the Trial Chamber found that the effect of Hartmann’s disclosure of confidential information decreased the likelihood that states would cooperate with the Tribunal in the future, thereby undermining its ability to exercise its jurisdiction to prosecute and punish serious violations of humanitarian law.
Several days ago the ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected all the grounds of appeal advanced by Florence Hartmann, convicted for contempt of the court.
Hartman, a journalist, served as the spokesperson for the former ICTY Prosecutor Carla del Ponte in 2000-2006.
In 2009, she disclosed in her publications some information in violation of two confidential Appeals Chamber’s decisions in the Milosevic case.
Rejecting one of the grounds of the appeal, the Appeals Chamber held that there is no strong presumption of unrestricted publicity for matters a Chamber has ruled are not to be disclosed to the public.
In this regard the Appeals Chamber recalled that Article 19(3) of the ICCPR recognises that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression may be subject to certain restrictions.
The restrictions shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary, in particular, for the protection of public order.
The Chamber further referred to the travaux préparatoires of the ICCPR which indicate that the protection of public order in Article 19(3) of the ICCPR was intended to include the prohibition of the procurement and dissemination of confidential information.
The Chamber also noted that, in respect of whether the restriction to an individual’s freedom of expression is “necessary” to achieve its aim, the Human Rights Committee considered whether the action taken was proportionate to the sought-after aim.
The Chamber found that the two appeal decisions in the Milosevic case contained restrictions on the freedom of expression that were “provided by law” because they were filed confidentially under protective measures granted pursuant to Rule 54bis of the ICTY Rules.
Furthermore, according to the Chamber, restricting Hartmann’s freedom of expression in this manner was both proportionate and necessary because it protected the “public order” by guarding against the dissemination of confidential information. These restrictions were therefore within the ambit of Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.
In this regard, the Appeals Chamber observed that the Trial Chamber found that the effect of Hartmann’s disclosure of confidential information decreased the likelihood that states would cooperate with the Tribunal in the future, thereby undermining its ability to exercise its jurisdiction to prosecute and punish serious violations of humanitarian law.
See Hartmann, Judgement, Case No. IT-02-54-R77.5-A, App. Ch., 19 July 2011